The invention relates generally to apparatuses for enabling the counting of votes in an election. It relates specifically to such an apparatus adapted to enable electronic computerized programming, testing, formating, counting, storing, reading, aggregating and delivery of the results of votes recorded by voters on ballot cards, without exposing the ballot card to any person other than the voter.
The prior art includes devices, at a central station in an election district, for electronically counting and delivering the results of votes cast on ballot cards at polling places in election precincts remote from the central station, upon bringing sealed ballot boxes, in which the ballot cards are inserted by the voters, from such remote stations back to the central station.
Such devices are adapted for use in a number of states which permit ballots to be transported uncounted from the remote precinct polling places back to the central station for counting. However, a large number of states which use ballot cards in elections require that the votes recorded on such ballot cards be counted at the remote precinct polling places, with the results of such vote counts to then be delivered to a central station, as by a telephone report thereon, at which central station all such votes are then tallied to provide the results of the election. Such requirement for on-site counting is generally based on an effort to maintain the secrecy of the ballots and reduce the opportunities for tampering with the ballots in any manner, and to enable ready identification of the persons responsible for the ballots, for investigation and interrogation in the event of any voting irregularities.
However, in those states which require on-site vote counting at remote precinct polling places, the sealed ballot box in which the ballot cards are inserted by the voters must be unsealed at such remote site to enable counting of such ballots. This procedure eliminates the secrecy of the ballots and provides an opportunity for tampering with the ballots, outside of the direct control of supervisory personnel at the central station. Further, there are no supervisory controls to insure that the election is conducted pursuant to the agreement of all persons responsible for the conduct of the election at each such remote precinct polling place. Still further, the counting of the votes on the ballot cards isperformed manually, a very time-consuming, error-prone, non-secret, and non-secure process. The telephoning-in of the results of the vote is likewise an error-prone, non-secret, and non-secure method of transmitting same.